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THE MODERN THREAT: DATA BREACHES, SECURITY
MEASURES, AND A CALL FOR CHANGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Data breaches are a major threat to the public at large, and no
individual or industry is safe from them.1 In 2018, there were 1,244 data
breaches, ranging in areas from banking to education and government.2
Due to those breaches, a whopping 446 million records were stolen from
individuals, including financial information and Social Security number. 3
Of the 1,244 data breaches, 135 (10.9%) fall into the banking/credit/financial category.4 Consumers are rightfully concerned about the privacy
of their data and its ability to be compromised in the event of a major
breach.5 Individuals view the compromise of their information as an infringement, and they are aware that the risk of losing personal information to malicious parties is much greater now than it ever has been due
to the high frequency of data breaches in today’s world.6
This Note focuses on recent high-profile data breaches and the
questions that arise in their wake. This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part
II outlines recent major data breaches that have occurred.7 Part III uses
field research to analyze and pinpoint how consumer trust is affected in a
negative way when customers are confronted with a data breach.8 Part

1. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT (Jan. 7,
2019), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ITRC_2018-End-of-YearAftermath_FINALWEB-V2-1.pdf (illustrating that data breaches have affected a large
amount of people and virtually every industry).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. (defining this sector to include “entities such as banks, credit unions, credit
card companies, mortgage and loan brokers, financial services, investment firms and trust
companies, payday lenders and pension funds.”).
5. See FICO Survey: US Consumers Fear Bank Fraud and ID Theft More Than Terrorist Attack, PR NEWSWIRE (July 27, 2017, 8:30 ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fico-survey-us-consumers-fear-bank-fraud-and-id-theft-more-than-terrorist-attack300492706.html (“44 percent of US consumers rate identity theft and banking fraud as their
top concern.”).
6. See id. (“The loss of your personal information or money from your account cuts
deep, it is a violation, and people now know it’s much more likely to happen to them.”).
7. See infra Part II (discussing recent data breaches).
8. See infra Part III (analyzing consumer trust after a breach).
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IV identifies the common security measures used by banks and looks at
new developments in cybersecurity.9 Part V focuses on consumers’ negative reactions when faced with additional security measures and the
banking industry’s acknowledgement that increased security measures
negatively affect their customers’ experiences.10 Part VI lays out a blueprint for the future of data security, including a recommendation for federal cybersecurity regulation for the financial industry, as well as a call to
require all regulators to include the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool
(“CAT”) as part of their examinations.11 Lastly, Part VII concludes that
these options would likely lessen the frequency of breaches.12
II. HISTORY OF DATA BREACHES
In December 2014, Sony Pictures “admitted to having suffered a
major cybersecurity breach.”13 Hackers managed to steal and release individuals’ private information and sensitive documents, which they then
released to the public.14 In the days before Thanksgiving 2014, Sony employees who attempted to access their computers were met with an unfamiliar image.15 Over the following weeks multiple statements, allegedly
from the Guardians of Peace (“GOP”), were posted online.16 The statements were followed by links to download a large amount of information

9. See infra Part IV (detailing security measures commonly used).
10. See infra Part V (focusing on how consumers and banks feel about additional security

measures).
11. See infra Part VI (discussing a call for change).
12. See infra Part VII (concluding that meaningful change could help to prevent these
breaches from occurring with such great frequency).
13. Joseph Steinberg, Massive Security Breach at Sony-Here’s What You Need to Know,
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/12/11/massive-security-breach-at-sony-heres-what-you-need-toknow/#3d0b9c9344d8.
14. Id.
15. See Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictureshack-explained/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b658d53f0f59 (“Sony Pictures employees who
tried to log into their computers were greeted with a graphic of a neon red skeleton featuring
the words ‘#Hacked by #GOP,’ and a threat to release data later that night if an unspecified
request was not met.”).
16. See id. (detailing that of the information posted online, many were “to a text-sharing
site called PasteBin, which is also used by some hacktivist groups.”); see also Hacktivist,
OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hacktivist (last visited
Jan. 29, 2019) (defining hacktivist as “A person who gains unauthorized access to computer
files or networks in order to further social or political ends.”).
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belonging to Sony.17 In a memo shortly after the first leak, Sony Pictures
executives acknowledged the major theft of confidential data in a statement, and acknowledged that personal information could be in the
hacker’s hands.18
The banking sector was not spared, as it fell victim to a cyberattack as well.19 In October 2014, JPMorgan “revealed that seventy-six
million households and seven million small businesses may have had
their private data compromised in a cyberattack.”20 In an SEC filing,
JPMorgan stated that their users’ personal contact information, as well as
their account information, had been taken.21 After charging the individuals responsible for the attack, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York called it “the single-largest theft of data from a U.S. financial institution.”22
This problem has continued to rear its ugly head recently.23 TMobile suffered a breach that affected two million customers, during
which their personal and account information was compromised.24 While
T-Mobile was quick to alert customers that their Social Security numbers
and financial information were not compromised, customers were cautioned to be on guard going forward.25 A breach of this type has the

17. See Peterson, supra note 15 (discussing that there were “huge amounts of what appeared to be data from Sony Pictures’ internal networks.”).
18. See Peterson, supra note 15 (“While we are not yet sure of the full scope of information that the attackers have or might release, we unfortunately have to ask you to assume
that information about you in the possession of the company might be in their possession.”).
19. Sam Ro, JPMorgan Reveals Gigantic Data Breach Possibly Affecting 76 Million
Households, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-data-breach-2014-10.
20. Id.
21. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (October 2, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312514362173/d799478d8k.htm;
see also id. (detailing that the extent of the breach was “user contact information—name,
address, phone number and email address—and internal JPMorgan Chase information relating to such users have been compromised.”).
22. See Portia Crowe, JPMorgan Fell Victim to the Largest Theft of Customer Data From
a Financial Institution in US History, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2015, 10:12 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-hacked-bank-breach-2015-11 (detailing that the
total number of customers affected was 83 million, according to Preet Bharara).
23. Jerry Beilinson, Two Million T-Mobile Customers Are Hit by A Data Breach,
CONSUMER REPORTS (August 24, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/2-milliont-mobile-customers-hit-by-data-breach/.
24. Id.
25. See id. (stating that other threats can exist even in the absence of stolen financial
information).
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potential to increase vulnerability for customers.26 While customers become most alarmed when their Social Security Number or credit card information is compromised, other stolen information can be just as detrimental to privacy.27 For example, if a hacker obtains account
information, they can send an email that looks identical to one a customer
would receive from T-Mobile, containing accurate account and billing
information; these are attempts to steal the customer’s password, which
would give the hacker full access to the online account.28
The aforementioned breaches only represent a small subset of the
high-profile data breaches that have occurred.29 Banks and financial institutions face an average of eighty-five breach attempts per year.30 The
average cost of a breach is around four million dollars, yet, in an industry
that is as highly regulated as financial services is, the costs extend far
beyond that of the average price due to consumers switching financial
institutions.31
III. CONSUMER TRUST IN THE WAKE OF A BREACH
While overall data demonstrates that consumers are likely to discontinue the relationship with their bank after a breach, there was a
slightly different result when responses were focused solely on millennials.32 A Gallup poll revealed that an overwhelming majority of millennials are extremely trusting when it comes to companies protecting their
26. See id. (“In a phishing attack, criminals could send a consumer a counterfeit email—
with a real account number and billing information—claiming to be from T-Mobile and asking him or her to follow a link and log in. Such an email could be an attempt to trick the
consumer into revealing a password.”).
27. See id. (“Companies are quick to reassure consumers if no Social Security numbers
or credit card numbers were stolen, but other data losses can create just as much havoc,” says
Robert Richter, who leads privacy and security testing at Consumer Reports.).
28. See id. (“In a phishing attack, criminals could send a consumer a counterfeit email—
with a real account number and billing information—claiming to be from T-Mobile and asking him or her to follow a link and log in. Such an email could be an attempt to trick the
consumer into revealing a password.”).
29. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 1 (discussing the high number of breaches
that have taken place).
30. Rocco Grillo, Regulatory Compliance Does Not Equal Cybersecurity, CLEARING
HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q2-banking-perspectives/articles/regulatory-compliance-does-not-equal-cybersecurity (last visited January
17, 2019).
31. Id.
32. John H. Fleming & Amy Adkins, Data Security: Not a Big Concern for Millennials,
GALLUP (June 9, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/192401/data-security-notbig-concern-millennials.aspx.
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information.33 The poll results showed that millennials are much more
trusting of their respective financial institutions than non-millennials
(67% for millennials as compared to 56% of non-millennials).34 The report concluded that millennials may even be naïve when it comes to the
security of their online information.35
IV. DATA SECURITY MEASURES
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(“FFIEC”) was founded in 1979, pursuant to “the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978.”36 The FFIEC is an
organization tasked with creating “uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial institutions.”37 An
important FFIEC development relating to cybersecurity was CAT, which
was unveiled in 2017.38 The purpose of CAT is to assist organizations
with identifying risks and determining the maturity of their cybersecurity
measures.39 CAT is structured as a two-step process: first, management
of the organization determines its “risk profile” based on five categories:
(1) Technologies and Connection Types; (2) Delivery Channels; (3)
Online/Mobile Products and Technology Services; (4) Organizational
Characteristics; and (5) External Threats.40 The next step for management is to calculate their “Cybersecurity Maturity” according to five domains: (1) Cyber Risk Management and Oversight; (2) Threat Intelligence and Collaboration; (3) Cybersecurity Controls; (4) External
Dependency Management; and (5) Cyber Incident Management and

33. See id. (“[The study] found that an impressive 80% of [millennials] say they have
‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of trust in the companies they do business with to keep their personal information secure.”).
34. See id. (“Millennials exhibit the greatest amount of trust in their primary bank, with
67% of this group saying they have a lot of trust in this institution, compared with 56% of
non-millennials.”).
35. See id. (“[M]illennials seem to rise above [data breaches], remaining trusting—and
perhaps idealistic—in the face of an abundance of evidence that their online data might not
be very secure.”).
36. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, ABOUT THE FFIEC (last
modified August 29, 2018, 1:11 PM), https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm.
37. Id.
38. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY
ASSESSMENT TOOL at 1 (May 2017), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_May_2017.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Resilience.41 CAT is useful because it allows management to evaluate
their organization’s maturity levels in comparison to their risk.42 Maturity levels rank from baseline, which constitutes the minimum expectations, to innovative, which entails creating new controls or tools.43
CAT was designed for institutions to assess their preparedness for
breach events.44 The FFIEC gives institutions a process capable of repetition in order to ensure they are ready in the case of an attack on their
data and information.45 While use of CAT is not required, it provides a
step-by-step process that is of value to financial institutions.46
One common security measure used by banks and financial institutions is two-step authentication.47 Two-step authentication is structured
as follows: first, a consumer signs in with their credentials.48 After entry
of their credentials, the consumer must enter another piece of information, which usually takes the form of a code sent to a linked mobile
phone.49 The common belief of institutions is that by having this additional layer of security, hackers will be unable to access a consumer’s
information solely on the basis of having the consumer’s password.50
This common belief, however, may be a colossal misconception.51
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2 (detailing that it allows management to “determine whether its maturity levels

are appropriate in relation to its risk. If not, the institution may take action either to reduce the
level of risk or to increase the levels of maturity.”).
43. See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY
ASSESSMENT TOOL at 7 (May 2017), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_May_2017.pdf. (stating that the maturity levels are: Baseline, Evolving,
Intermediate, Advanced, and Innovative).
44. Id. at 2.
45. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC RELEASE UPDATE
TO
CYBERSECURITY
ASSESSMENT
TOOL
(May
31,
2017),
https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr053117.htm (“[The FFIEC] developed the Assessment to help
financial institution management determine the institution’s risk profile, inherent risks and
cybersecurity preparedness. The Assessment provides a repeatable and measurable process
that financial institution management may use to measure cybersecurity preparedness over
time.”).
46. Id.
47. Two-Factor Authentication Helps Protect the One and Only You, WELLS FARGO,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy-security/fraud/articles/two-factor-authentication/ (last
visited February 8, 2019) (discussing how Wells Fargo uses two-factor authentication).
48. See id. (detailing how two-step authentication is carried out).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Laurene Hummer, What’s Wrong with SMS Authentication? Two IBM Experts
Weigh In on the NIST Recommendation, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (September 7, 2016),
https://securityintelligence.com/whats-wrong-with-sms-authentication-two-ibm-expertsweigh-in-on-the-nist-recommendation/ (discussing the short-comings of two-step authentication when it comes to text messages).
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In May 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) recommended the phasing-out of text message authentication
as the second step in two-step authentication.52 Two-step authentication
falls short of absolute security due to the possibility of a consumer unknowingly downloading malware onto their phone.53 Thus, hackers can
authorize their malware to keep track of consumer text messages.54 Even
in the absence of malware, hackers can intercept and spy on text messages.55
A new development with a slight twist on the traditional model
of two-step authentication is the advent of Duo Mobile.56 Duo Mobile is
an app for mobile devices or tablets that uses two-step authentication, but
does so by the approval of push notifications rather than online insertion
of a code texted to a mobile phone.57 Users can thus thwart unauthorized
attempts to access their information by simply denying the unexpected
push notification that appears.58
The Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council has created
the new “Financial Services Sector Cybersecurity Profile” as an extension of the NIST framework already in existence.59 The profile is very
flexible and adaptable, and can be used on the smallest community bank

52. Id.; see also NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 80063-3, DIGITAL IDENTITY GUIDELINES (June 2017) (detailing why text message authentication
is problematic).
53. See Hummer, supra note 51; Malware, NORTON BY SYMANTEC, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) (“Malware is an abbreviated form of ‘malicious software.’ This is software that is specifically designed to gain access
to or damage a computer, usually without the knowledge of the owner.”).
54. See Hummer, supra note 51 (“[A] fraudster can simply command the malware to
monitor text messages.”).
55. Hummer, supra note 51.
56. See Secure Two-Factor Authentication App, DUO, https://duo.com/product/trustedusers/two-factor-authentication/duo-mobile (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) (“Logging in securely
is fast and easy with Duo Push, the more secure method of two-factor authentication supported
by Duo Mobile.”).
57. See id. (“Users quickly verify their identity by approving push notifications before
accessing applications.”).
58. See id. (“[Someone] can easily stop fraudulent attempts to access company data by
tapping the deny button.”).
59. See Lydia Beyoud, Financial Industry Unveils Streamlined Cyber Compliance Standard, BLOOMBERG LAW (October 25, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/financial-industry-unveils-streamlined-cyber-compliance-standard-1 (“The ‘financial services sector cybersecurity profile’ is intended as an extension of an existing
cybersecurity framework established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).”).
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or the largest bank in the world.60 In using this new profile, financial
institutions can expect to reduce their compliance responsibilities between forty-nine and seventy-three percent.61
Wells Fargo, the third largest bank in the United States, lays out
on their website precisely how they identify their customers and protect
their data.62 One of the notable features Wells Fargo employs is the use
of a one-time password in order to establish identity if there is a high-risk
transaction taking place.63 An example of a high-risk transaction is sending money to an individual for the first time, or being transferred funds
from a non-Wells account for the first time.64 Moreover, in addition to
the use of two-step authentication, Wells Fargo goes above and beyond
with the use of biometric authentication.65 Biometric authentication requires customers to use their fingerprints or facial features to sign into
their mobile banking app.66 When it comes to data protection, Wells
Fargo has minimum encryption and browser requirements, as well as an
ongoing monitoring scheme.67 The browser requirement is designed to
block older browsers that are not as secure, while the monitoring scheme
will require further proof of authentication if a customer’s banking transactions and behaviors sway from their usual pattern.68
In an interesting turn of events, banks and financial institutions
are working together to assess their respective levels of preparedness for
simultaneous cyberattacks.69 In October 2018, JPMorgan Chase,
60. See id. (“The profile can be scaled to match a financial institution’s size and needs,
from community banks to the largest multinational financial institutions.”).
61. Id.
62. Amanda Dixon, America’s Fifteen Largest Banks, BANKRATE (February 21, 2018),
https://www.bankrate.com/banking/americas-top-10-biggest-banks/#slide=1; see How We
Protect You, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy-security/fraud/protectingyou (last visited February 8, 2019) (detailing their consumer protection devices).
63. See How We Protect You, supra note 62 (indicating that Advanced Access is triggered
when a high-risk transaction is involved); Advanced Access Questions, WELLS FARGO,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/help/online-banking/advanced-access-faqs/ (last visited February 8, 2019) (defining Advanced Access as “a free service that gives you an additional layer
of security to better protect your information and help prevent unauthorized transactions.”).
64. See Advanced Access Questions, supra note 63 (requiring use of Advanced Access
for “[sending] money to another person that you haven’t transferred money to before, or receive money from a non-Wells Fargo account that you haven’t used before.”).
65. How We Protect You, supra note 62.
66. How We Protect You, supra note 62.
67. How We Protect You, supra note 62.
68. See How We Protect You, supra note 62 (“[O]utdated browsers could lead to a security risk.”).
69. See Yalman Onaran, Global Payment Firms Hold First Cyber War Game,
BLOOMBERG
(October
12,
2018,
10:13
AM),
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Mastercard, American Express, and others participated in exercises that
unveiled crucial information about their varying approaches to defining
what constitutes a “crisis.”70 The results of this exercise will be used to
create a more streamlined system between these participating institutions,
including an effort to efficiently communicate information about various
threats.71
V. CONSUMER AND BANK REACTION TO SECURITY MEASURES
Banks and financial institutions are cognizant of how the security
measures they enact impact customer satisfaction.72 A survey conducted
by Information Security Media Group discovered that 53% of financial
institutions believe their customers view some of their security controls
as inconvenient.73 Moreover, 54% of institutions believe that they do a
fair job balancing the priorities of responding to threats against cybersecurity and keeping the customer experience pleasant.74 While banks appear to be moderately pleased with their ability to balance safety and consumer satisfaction, they are confident in their ability to defend a
cyberthreat.75 A study found that 78% of institutions have faith in their
cybersecurity strategy as a whole.76

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-09/global-payment-firms-hold-firstcyber-war-game-to-test-readiness (“Global payment companies held their first joint cybersecurity war games to test their systems’ readiness for simultaneous attacks, uncovering differences in their defenses including even how to define a crisis.”).
70. See id. (“The participants discovered that they had varying definitions of a crisis related to breaches as well as differing approaches in how they reach out to law enforcement.”).
71. See id. (“The sector will also seek a more formal way of sharing information on
threats.”).
72. See INFO. SEC. MEDIA GRP., PRESERVING THE CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE (2016) (stating
that 63% of respondents say, when it comes to cybersecurity, that preserving a seamless customer experience is a top priority).
73. See id. (“[The survey] generated more than 150 responses from financial institutions
primarily in the U.S., Canada, EMEA, Asia, and Australia. Respondent organizations all had
1,000 or more employees, and 30 percent manage assets of $20 billion or more.”).
74. See id. (stating that they “say their organizations currently maintain a fair balance
between cybersecurity and maintaining the online customer experience.”).
75. Steve Evans, Banks Confident About Cybersecurity, but Gaps Remain, INFOSECURITY
GROUP (March 9, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/banks-confidentabout-cybersecurity/.
76. See id.; James Murphy, Accenture Report: Banks Confident in Cybersecurity Capabilities But Lack of Real-World Testing Leaves Gaps in Their Defense, ACCENTURE (April 19,
2017), https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/accenture-report-banks-confident-in-cybersecurity-capabilities-but-lack-of-real-world-testing-leaves-gaps-in-their-defense.htm (conducting the survey by polling “275 senior security executives across the banking and capital markets sectors”).
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When it comes to the customer experience, millions of Americans
think security measures for phone and internet security are unduly burdensome.77 A Fair, Isaac, and Company (“FICO”) survey found that 81%
of Americans find security measures “unnecessary”.78 Customers are undoubtedly relieved that their financial institution cares about protecting
their information, but nonetheless are frustrated by how complicated the
measures are when it comes to simply using their account.79 Striking a
delicate balance between security and customer experience will be key
for institutions going forward.80
VI. THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND A CALL FOR REGULATION
A.

Regulatory Attempts and Failures

A development that has the potential for long-lasting impact is
the presence of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
Committee on Bank Supervision (“CBS”).81 In its Fiscal Year 2018 Operating Plan, CBS listed cybersecurity among its highest priority objectives for the year.82 CBS called for an analysis of banks’ and financial
institutions’ abilities to withstand cyberattacks.83 A particularly

77. Scott Zoldi et al., Survey: Americans are Frustrated by Security Measures, FICO
BLOG (July 9, 2018), http://www.fico.com/en/blogs/fraud-security/survey-americans-arefrustrated-by-security-processes/.
78. See id. (detailing that the survey was conducted by FICO and 72 Point, and polled
2,000 adults).
79. Id.
80. See id. (quoting TJ Horan, who oversees fraud solutions at FICO: “When it comes to
digital transformation, a smooth customer experience is going to be vital. The winners will be
the firms that can balance this against the need to stop fraud.”).
81. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BANK
SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN, https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2017/nr-occ-2017-113a.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) [hereinafter OCC FISCAL YEAR
2018 BANK SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN]; Press Release by Bryan Hubbard, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Releases Bank Supervision Operating Plan for Fiscal Year
2018 (September 28, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2017/nr-occ-2017-113.html.
82. OCC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BANK SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN, supra note 81, at 1.
83. See id. at 6 (calling for “assessing specific cybersecurity controls as part of information security, including key areas of cybersecurity risk management, such as the service
providers’ risk management, control structures, and level of cyber resilience. Examiners
should assess banks’ service providers’ risk management structures for managing cybersecurity; assessing service providers’ level of cyber resilience and completing the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s Technology Service Provider Cybersecurity Assessment Tool as part of the examination process.”).
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interesting portion of CBS’ objective is their use of the FFIEC’s CAT.84
This illustrates how highly regarded CAT is for assessing an institution’s
cybersecurity protocol.85
For depository institutions, three of the main regulators are the
OCC, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).86 The FRB is the federal regulator of
state member banks, and the FDIC is the federal regulator for state nonmember banks.87 Moreover, the OCC is the chief regulator of national
banks as well as federal savings associations.88 Due to the important
function they serve, one would reasonably believe that the OCC has strict,
specific regulations that the banks they oversee must follow when it
comes to protection of customers’ data; however, this is not the case.89
That is not to say that the OCC has been negligent or has turned a blind
eye to this important issue.90 In October 2016, the OCC, FRB, and FDIC
promulgated a proposed regulation in regards to increased cybersecurity
standards for organizations they supervised, which included all banks,
savings associations, and savings banks.91
This proposed regulation would have only affected systematically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).92 The proposed rule

84. Id.
85. Id. at 4.
86. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE

ACTIVITIES 135 (5th ed. 2017).
87. Id.
88. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC REGULATIONS,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/laws-regulations/occ-regulations/index-occ-regulations.html (last visited January 17, 2019) [hereinafter OCC REGULATIONS].
89. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FINAL ISSUANCES,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/laws-regulations/occ-regulations/final-issuances/index-final-issuances.html. (last visited January 17, 2019) [hereinafter FINAL ISSUANCES] (detailing
how the OCC has promulgated numerous rules over the years, without any relating to cybersecurity).
90. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AGENCIES ISSUE ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING ON ENHANCED CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (October 19, 2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16092.html.
91. Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards: A Proposed Rule by the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Fed. Reserve System, and the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp’n, 82 Fed. Reg.
8172 (proposed October 26, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.pt. 364).
92. Shaun Waterman, Business Lobby Pushes Back on Cyber Rule for Banks,
CYBERSCOOP (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.cyberscoop.com/us-chamber-fdic-occ-federal-reserve-bank-cyber-rule/; see also Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards: A Proposed
Rule by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Fed. Reserve System, and the Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp’n, 82 Fed. Reg. 8172 (proposed October 26, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.pt. 364)
(referring to those with more than $50 billion in assets, labeled systemically important by the
Dodd-Frank financial reforms.).
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narrowed their focus to SIFIs in that these are the institutions capable of
having a large impact on the financial system in the event that a cyberattack were to cripple one of these institutions.93 The regulators allowed
for an extended comment period in order to allow interested individuals
an opportunity to let their voices be heard on this important and complicated topic.94 However, a final rule was never promulgated once the comment period closed.95 A common comment expressed concern about adding more regulation, instead proposing the centralization of existing
regulations and the plugging of gaps in the regulatory framework instead.96 Another concern focused on how an additional regulation would
create an inflexible structure.97
The main reason a final rule never came to fruition can be traced
to remarks made by the United States Chamber of Commerce.98 In a letter sent to the OCC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and
the FDIC, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce expressed concern that strict
requirements on banks and financial institutions would be unduly specific
and would simply be a formulaic list of requirements.99 The focal point
of the Chamber of Commerce’s letter was the formulaic list concern.100
The letter concluded by stating, “[c]ybersecurity is not a one-size-fits-all
proposition.”101 The Chamber of Commerce felt that organizations

93. Id.
94. Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8172.
95. See FINAL ISSUANCES, supra note 89 (listing the final rules promulgated by the OCC,

and not including “Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards.”).
96. See THE CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, COMMENT LETTER ON PROPOSED ENHANCED CYBER
RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 3 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.theclearinghouse.org//media/tch/documents/tchweekly/2017/20170217_comment_letter_enhanced_cyber_risk_management_standards.pdf (“The Clearing House accordingly recommends that, prior to proceeding with new requirements, the agencies should focus on consolidating existing standards,
and work with industry stakeholders to assess the gaps that exist in the current regulatory
framework….”).
97. See id. (“Addressing the mechanism through prescriptive standards embeds inflexibility and a lack of responsiveness to new risks, which weakens institution-specific and sectoral risk management capabilities, and works at counter-purpose to our shared goals.”).
98. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMENT LETTER ON PROPOSED ENHANCED CYBER
RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 6 (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/us_chamber_enhanced_standards_comment_letter_011817.pdf.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 98 at 6.
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should be allowed to create a cybersecurity program based on their individual needs.102
State regulators are supplementing the efforts of federal regulators to fill the gaps they see in the regulatory structure.103 The New York
State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) unveiled its cybersecurity requirements for financial services companies in March 2017.104 The
DFS believed that new requirements were needed after finding that data
breaches cost New York businesses upwards of $1.3 billion.105 The DFS
called for financial institutions to put measures in place, such as implementing a cybersecurity program and designating a Chief Information
Security Officer106 to protect customer information, and gave examples
of acceptable security measures.107 This scheme would have co-existed
alongside the proposed rule that was never adopted, due to the fact that
the NY scheme does not limit its scope specifically to SIFIs.108
B.

Two Potential Courses of Action

Why should the onus be placed upon the banking and finance sector when breaches occur in virtually every industry?109 Simply put, humans value money over most anything, and are likely to make changes

102. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 98 at 6 (“[C]ompanies must develop
cybersecurity programs that are tailored to the risks that they face and their unique operational
requirements.”).
103. See NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANIES (2017), https://blog.vasco.com/download/2416/ (codifying
New York’s cybersecurity regulations).
104. Id.
105. See Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN’S OFFICE, INFO. EXPOSED (July 14,
2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/data_breach_report071414.pdf (stating that the exact cost has
been $1.37 billion).
106. See Waterman, supra note 92 (laying out the regulatory requirements).
107. See Michael Magrath, Top Banking Regulations & Security Compliance Requirements for 2018, ONESPAN, (August 29, 2018), https://blog.vasco.com/legal/top-banking-regulations-security-compliance-requirements-2018 (“Through a risk assessment, financial institutions must implement effective controls to prevent unauthorized access to information
systems or non-public information. These controls may include multi-factor authentication,
biometric authentication, or risk-based authentication.”).
108. See NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 103 (stating that “Covered
Entity” is defined as “any Person operating under or required to operate under a license, registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the Banking
Law, the Insurance Law or the Financial Services Law.”).
109. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 1, at 9 (detailing that breaches occurred in
sectors including banking, business, education, government, and medical).
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when their money may be compromised.110 Therefore, since money is
kept in the hands of banks and financial institutions, the pressure is
ramped up on these entities.111 Moreover, banks are of the utmost importance to our financial system as they take deposits from customers and
then lend that money out to borrowers and attach an interest rate.112
When banks fail, there is a massive ripple effect, best evidenced by the
2008 Financial Crisis in which twenty-five banks failed and closed, almost immediately, with many more following suit.113
The issue of cybersecurity for banks and financial institutions has
become large enough that functional regulation should be considered as
a viable option. Functional regulation is designed to make sure the “most
qualified and knowledgeable people” are overseeing a particular field,
such as banks or financial institutions.114 The advantages of functional
regulation include fairness and expertise.115 The fairness advantage
comes from the fact that all entities would be subject to the same cybersecurity regulations.116

110. See Suzanne Lucas, Americans Value Money Over Time Off, CBS MONEYWATCH
(Feb. 28, 2014, 8:23 AM) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-value-money-overtime-off/ (“Given a choice between an extra week of vacation or 5 percent increase in salary,
79 percent of Americans will take the raise, according to a recent survey by finance recruitment firm Accounting Principals.”); see also Rahul Telang & Sriram Somanchi, Security,
Fraudulent Transactions, and Customer Loyalty: A Field Study, CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIVERSITY (Nov. 12, 2016, 12 AM), https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2016/ISSecurity/Presentations/10/ (“[The study] focused on more than 500,000 customers of a leading U.S. bank over
a five-year period and found that customers who experienced unauthorized charges on their
account were one percentage point more likely than the average customer to end the relationship with their bank within the next six months.”).
111. See Caroline Fairchild, More Money Always Leads to More Happiness: Study,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/29/money-andhappiness-study_n_3179345.html (detailing that advances in income are always met with increases in life satisfaction).
112. See The Business of Banking, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 28, 1999), https://www.economist.com/unknown/1999/10/28/the-business-of-banking (“[Banks] are vital to economic activity, because they reallocate money, or credit, from savers, who have a temporary surplus
of it, to borrowers, who can make better use of it.”).
113. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BANK FAILURES IN BRIEF (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2008/index.html (briefly discussing the 25 banks
across the United States that failed in 2008).
114. Will Kenton, Functional Regulation, INVESTOPEDIA, (May 21, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/functional-regulation.asp.
115. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 86, at 282.
116. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 86, at 282 (“It is only fair that the same functions are regulated the same way, no matter what type of financial entity is performing the
function.”).
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However, there are potential downsides to functional regulation. Since this type of regulatory scheme divides regulatory authority
based on type of product or service, there can be potential conflicts when
innovation occurs and blends two defined services.118 One example depicts how this blending can be problematic: derivatives created a disagreement between the CFTC and SEC over which entity had regulatory
authority.119
In a functional regulatory scheme, a federal cybersecurity body
should be created with the power and authority to enact uniform standards
and regulations for the banking and financial industry. Creating a regulator that solely focuses on cybersecurity in the banking and finance industries would allow the regulator to become the “most qualified and
knowledgeable” regulator due to having a singular focus.120 The other
major regulators in banking, e.g. the OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC, are
responsible for regulating practically everything a bank does.121 If these
agencies attempt to regulate cybersecurity, in addition to the various complex issues they already oversee, this important issue likely will not receive the attention it deserves.122
117

117. See Patricia A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 12.02 21 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing
the several downsides of functional regulation).
118. See id. (“[B]ecause the functional approach divides regulatory authority according to
established product lines, the regulatory apparatus has difficulty resolving jurisdictional quarrels over product innovations, particularly for new products that are hybrids of the old.”).
119. See id. (“The SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission dueled over
who has jurisdiction over derivatives.”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 712, 717, 718, 722 12 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012) (2010)) (laying out the
extent to which the SEC and CFTC each have authority over derivatives).
120. See Kenton, supra note 114 (stating that functional regulations will make sure that
the “most qualified and knowledgeable people” are supervising a financial institution’s activities).
121. See OCC REGULATIONS, supra note 88 (detailing the various regulations promulgated
by the OCC as an example).
122. See generally Cesar Cerrudo, Why Cybersecurity Should Be The Biggest Concern of
2017,
FORBES
(Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/01/17/why-cybersecurity-should-be-the-biggest-concern-of-2017/#698fb1135218
(discussing the vital importance of cybersecurity).
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The problem with the current regulatory scheme is twofold.123
First, there are many entities that are attempting to regulate.124 This has
led to regulations that conflict without one holding more weight than others.125 Secondly, there is a tension between federal and state regulation
of cybersecurity.126 In addition to the aforementioned attempts by the
NYCDFS and the OCC, regulations and rules have poured in from the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the National
Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).127 However, these regulators are only a
subset of a much larger, murkier regulatory picture.128 Other major regulators in play include the FRB and the FDIC.129 An example is helpful
to illustrate the illogical nature of this system: The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is not required to structure its penalties with the “best
practices” put forward by the NIST.130
Moreover, the regulatory landscape is diluted due to the co-operative nature of state and federal cybersecurity laws.131 By allowing a majority of states to implement data breach notification requirements-and a
smaller subset of states attempting to get companies to follow guidelines
to protect data-there is an abundance of regulation for companies and organizations that conduct business across the country.132 This creates a
culture of inefficiency for companies that operate in multiple states, as
they must sort through potentially conflicting requirements. In practice,
cybersecurity and cyber-attacks are a national, and in most cases, global

123. See Karen A. Popp & Edward R. McNicholas, Regulatory Focus on Information Security Incidents, BUS. & COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN FED. COURTS at 2 (Robert L. Haig, ed., 4th ed.
2017) (detailing the numerous parties that have promulgated cybersecurity regulations); see
also Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985 (2018) (discussing the
problems with current cybersecurity regulations).
124. See Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123 (detailing the numerous parties that have
promulgated cybersecurity regulations).
125. See Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123 (discussing how the various parties that
have issued cybersecurity regulations have led to conflicting law).
126. See Kosseff, supra note 123 (discussing the problems with current cybersecurity regulations).
127. Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123.
128. Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123.
129. Federal Banking Regulators, COMPLIANCE ALLIANCE, https://www.compliancealliance.com/laws-regulations/bank-regulators (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
130. Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029.
131. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (discussing the problems with current cybersecurity regulations).
132. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (“[I]t is difficult to align a set of effective cybersecurity incentives that apply to companies with national operations.”).
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threat.133 It is not practical for states to exercise the control they currently
do, as this is an area that calls for strong leadership from the federal government.134 New York wanted to create a culture of regulatory compliance when they passed new regulations in 2017, and this federal regulatory body is poised to accomplish the same goal in a more uniform,
centralized manner.135
Creating a new regulatory body would eliminate the need for all
of the existing regulations that have been promulgated across different
regulatory bodies.136 The biggest potential benefit of having a new regulator would be the possibility of an increase in consumer confidence
about the protection of their data. Consumers would see that the federal
government is taking cybersecurity issues seriously, rather than letting
numerous agencies create rules and guidance on the issue.
An important practical point when it comes to this idea is the current political climate in the U.S.137 The idea of fewer regulations fits
within the Trump Administration’s theme of deregulation.138 In May
2018, President Trump signed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief,
and Consumer Protection Act, putting into place the “biggest rollback of
financial regulation since the Dodd-Frank Act.”139 Creating a new federal regulatory body falls in line with President Trump’s mission in that
doing so would allow the existing rules and regulations to be removed
and then replaced by one institution.140 The cumulative effect of rolling
back the existing regulations and replacing them with new regulations
promulgated by a federal body should-ideally-result in a net decrease in
133. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (discussing how cybersecurity threats are “inherently interstate (and global)” in nature).
134. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (discussing whether it is “practical—for states
to continue to exercise such control over the future of U.S. cybersecurity law.”).
135. See Sabrina Galli, Note, NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulations: A Blueprint for Uniform
State Statute?, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 235, 236 (2018) (“NYDFS’ new regulations place a
tremendous amount of responsibility on financial institutions and shift the business strategy
from a mindset of risk mitigation to one of regulatory compliance.”).
136. See Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123 (discussing the various bodies that have
promulgated regulations on the issue of cybersecurity).
137. See Terry Jones, Deregulation Nation: President Trump Cuts Regulations at Record
Rate, INVESTORS (August 14, 2018), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/deregulation-nation-president-trump-cuts-regulations-at-record-rate/ (discussing a policy goal of
the Trump Administration).
138. See id. (arguing that de-regulation is a focal point of the Trump Administration).
139. Elizabeth Dexheimer, Trump Signs Biggest RollBack of Bank Rules Since DoddFrank Act, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/trump-signs-biggest-rollback-of-bank-rules-since-dodd-frank-act.
140. Jones, supra note 137.
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number of regulations.141 Under this scheme, state regulations should be
preempted by the federal regulations, as the state regulations that were
designed to “plug gaps” will no longer be necessary.
A legitimate concern about this proposed course of action centers
around how a new regulator would be funded. The most logical funding
scheme would involve an examination fee being charged to each financial
institution. With the average cost of a breach hovering around $4 million,
notwithstanding additional costs such as loss of business, financial institutions should see the benefit of spending a small sum in the short-run in
order to save a large amount of money in the long-run.142
In the event that it is deemed too burdensome to create a new
federal agency, or that regulation will not be able to keep up with novel
scammer tactics, all regulators of the financial industry should be required to examine institutions based on CAT results. This possibility will
also shift the approach from punishing institutions that do not meet regulatory requirements to a system that focuses on helping banks avoid
cyber-attacks.143 One issue that makes this difficult is that some regulators have determined that use of CAT is not required.144 For example, the
FDIC, OCC, and FRB all have stated that use of CAT is optional.145
While all institutions are encouraged to use CAT to assess their
own maturity levels-and in fact many institutions have completed CAT
assessments-it is natural that some smaller institutions may not have the

141. Jones, supra note 137.
142. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“The average dollar cost of a breach is reported to be $4

million, yet regulated industries, such as health care and financial services, pay a higher price
because of fines and the higher-than-average rate of lost business and customers.”).
143. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL,
https://www.ffiec.gov/cyberassessmenttool.htm (last visited February 8, 2019) (explaining
that CAT will “help institutions identify their risks and determine their cybersecurity preparedness” because “[t]he Assessment provides a repeatable and measurable process for financial
institutions to measure their cybersecurity preparedness over time.”).
144. Tom Hinkel, Cybersecurity and Compliance: What You Need to Know, BANK NEWS,
https://www.banknews.com/blog/cybersecurity-and-compliance-what-you-need-to-know/
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
145. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL (July 2, 2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/fil15028.html (“Use of the Cybersecurity
Assessment Tool is voluntary.”); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
FFIEC CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL (June 30, 2015), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2015/bulletin-2015-31.html (“While use of the Assessment is optional for financial institutions, OCC examiners will use the Assessment to supplement exam work to
gain a more complete understanding of an institution’s inherent risk, risk management practices, and controls related to cybersecurity.”).
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infrastructure to conduct this voluntary review.146 This likely explains
why these three regulators make CAT use optional, as they do not want
to unduly burden smaller institutions.147 However, regulators still expect
smaller institutions to have infrastructure in place to keep track of cyber
threats and attacks.148 The difference is that rather than force these
smaller institutions to use CAT, which is time-consuming,149 they are allowed to seek out other alternatives, such as hiring an IT service provider.150
CAT assessment completion is not the end of the road; a crucial
following step is to conduct a “gap analysis.”151 This informs the institution of the measures necessary to bring the institution’s results into accordance with a desired level by either minimizing risk or enhancing maturity.152 The desired level is contingent on the amount of risk the
institution’s board of directors is willing to tolerate, and thus different for
almost every institution.153 After a risk tolerance is established by the
Board, the institution can establish whether the outstanding risks are
within the amount of tolerance accepted by the board.154
While requiring regulators to examine based on CAT results will
be an important first step, the examination will be fruitless without appropriate enforcement tools to use if CAT performance is deemed inadequate by the regulator. For example, the OCC has a variety of enforcement tools at its disposal, ranging from commitment letters and formal

146. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“[T]hreat intelligence and collaboration can be a challenge for smaller financial institutions that don’t have dedicated cybersecurity resources.”).
147. Hinkel, supra note 144.
148. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“Even though your community bank may lack the size
and complexity of the larger national banks, regulators still expect all financial institutions to
identify and monitor cyber threats, and to use that information to inform their own risk environment as well as their specific controls.”).
149. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“The CAT assessment itself is 123 pages, with 69 questions and 10 categories.”).
150. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (stating that another option for cybersecurity, other than
performing a CAT, is “utilizing a local IT service provider”).
151. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“Once your bank has completed both sections of the
CAT, management should perform a gap analysis to determine the next steps.”).
152. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“The gap analysis should rank in importance the actions
needed to reduce risks or increase control maturity in order to bring the actual state of operations in line with the desired state.”).
153. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“The desired state should be based on an official risk
appetite approved by the board.”).
154. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (stating how once banks settle on a risk tolerance, they
can evaluate whether their current risks are at a level that fits into their risk tolerance).
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agreements to civil money penalties.155 These tools will need to be used
by the OCC to bring financial institutions into accordance with adequate
standards.156 The FDIC states that they will communicate with the institution they are examining about CAT in order to ensure awareness of the
tool, but this is not enough.157 Simply putting an institution on notice
about CAT will not make a difference; the institutions that are not up to
an appropriate standard based on the findings of CAT will need to be
informed of their deficiency. Moreover, the FDIC needs defined enforcement tools in place specifically designed to handle issues regarding
CAT.158
By requiring that regulators examine institution’s using CAT results, financial institutions will be forced to come face-to-face with their
cybersecurity issues.159 Most institutions have already acknowledged the
major threat that a cyber-attack poses.160 For the institutions whose CAT
results are problematic, the regulator will be able to better point out these
deficiencies, ideally allowing the institution to rapidly fix their problems.
At the end of the day, banks and financial institutions should
make it a fundamental goal to reach a high level of cyber-resilience.161
These institutions should shift the focus from a system of attempting to
simply comply with applicable regulations to one of effective

155. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ENFORCEMENT ACTION
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUALS, (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2018/bulletin-2018-41.html (laying out the various informal and formal enforcement mechanisms at the OCC’s disposal).
156. See id. (setting forth the various informal and formal enforcement mechanisms at the
OCC’s disposal).
157. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 145 (“FDIC examiners will discuss the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool with institution management during examinations to ensure
awareness and assist with answers to any questions.”).
158. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS (September 4, 2018), https://www5.fdic.gov/EDO/index.html (explaining that the FDIC can initiate
“enforcement actions…. for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or unsound banking practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of final orders, conditions imposed in
writing or written agreements.”).
159. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 145 (“While use of
the Assessment is optional for financial institutions, OCC examiners will use the Assessment
to supplement exam work to gain a more complete understanding of an institution’s inherent
risk, risk management practices, and controls related to cybersecurity.”).
160. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“Companies in North America view cybercrime and hacking as their No. 1 risk.”).
161. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“Ultimately, cyberresilience—the ability to defend, respond to, and recover from a breach—is the end goal for financial institutions, which tend to
be facing thousands of attacks every day.”).
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cybersecurity due diligence.162 Mandating the completion of CAT, combined with regulators having appropriate enforcement tools if institutions’ CAT results are found to be inadequate, is a central first-step towards achieving cyberresilience.163
VII. CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity and protection of consumer data is a major issue
facing the world today.164 Banks and financial institutions should be
aware that consumers may sever ties with their respective bank after a
data breach occurs.165 The call for uniform federal cybersecurity regulation is one that could have long-lasting effects for the banking and financial industry. One potential explanation for the high number of breaches
that occur today is the lack of uniform standards employed by various
institutions.166 If every institution were monitored and required to employ at least a minimum baseline of protection, hackers would not be able
to take advantage of institutions with suboptimal security requirements.167
Regardless of which method is used, it is clear that federal action
is required on this issue.168 Consumers need to feel that their representatives have the same degree of urgency about this issue as they do. The
OCC’s inclusion of cybersecurity among its main objectives for this fiscal year is a step in the right direction169, but in order for meaningful
change to take place, consumers need a regulatory body with the ability
to touch a wide variety of institutions to develop regulations and rules in
a uniform manner.170 If swift action is not taken, the damage to sensitive
information could be devastating.
162. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“The focus should be shifted toward conducting good cyber
due diligence and assessments.”).
163. See Grillo, supra note 30 (discussing cyberresilience).
164. See supra Part I (discussing the data breaches that have occurred).
165. See supra Part III (detailing consumer reactions to data breaches).
166. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 1 (discussing the high number of breaches
that have taken place).
167. See James A. Lewis, Raising the Bar for Cybersecurity, CTR FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUDIES (Feb. 12, 2013), csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130212_Lewis_RaisingBarCybersecurity.pdf (“96% of successful breaches could have
been avoided if the victim had put in place simple or intermediate controls.”).
168. See supra Part VI (discussing two options for change).
169. OCC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BANK SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN, supra note 81.
170. See supra Part VI (discussing the need for uniform federal cybersecurity regulation
for the financial industry).
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